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Abstract 
The paper reports on a study on Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond 
conducted jointly by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
and the World Energy Council (WEC). All together three cases of economic and energy 
developments were developed that sprawl into six scenarios of energy supply alternatives 
extending until the end of the 21st century. The internal consistency of the scenarios was 
assessed with the help of formal energy models. The study took close account of world 
population prospects, economic growth, technological advance, the energy resource base, 
environmental implications from the local to the global level, financing requirements, and 
the future prospects of both fossil and non-fossil fuels and industries. Although no analysis 
can turn an uncertain future into a sure thing, the study identifies patterns that are robust 
across a purposely broad range of scenarios. The study also enables to relate alternative 
near term research and development, technology, economic, and environmental policies to 
the possible long-term divergence of energy systems structures. Due to the long lead times 
involved in the turnover of capital stock and infrastructures of the energy system, policies 
would need to be implemented now in order to initiate long-term structural changes in the 
energy system that would however become significant only after the year 2020. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper summarises a study of long-term energy prospects conducted jointly by the Interna- 
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the World Energy Council (WEC). 
The study report Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond [I] was presented at the 16th 
WEC Congress in Tokyo, October 1995. 
The study is based on the formulation of alternative scenarios, corroborated by an integrated 
assessment framework of energy-environmental models under development at IIASA (for an 
overview see the Appendix I on methodology). The 1993 WEC Commission report Energy for 
Tomorrow's World [2] outlined global energy perspectives and related issues in some detail to 
the year 2020. The Commission report's broader outline to 2100 served as a starting point of 
the analysis reported here. 
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Table 1: A summary for three cases in 2050 and 2100. 
Case 
A B C 
High Growth Middle Course Ecologically Driven 
Population in 10' 
2050 10.1 10.1 10.1 
2100 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Energy intensity decline medium low 
PEIGDP, %/yr 
World (1 990-2050) -1 .O -0.7 
World (1 990-2100) -1 .O -0.8 
Primary energy demand, Gtoe 
2050 25 
2100 45 
Resource availability 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
Technology costs 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
Technology dynamics 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
high medium 
high medium 
low medium 
low medium 
high 
low 
high 
high 
low 
high medium medium 
high medium high 
C 0 2  emission constraint no no Yes 
Carbon emissions, GtC 
2050 
2100 
Environmental taxes no no Yes 
Number of scenarios 3 1 2 
"Gross World Product 
The CasesIScenarios 
Three alternative cases of long-term economic and energy developments were used to explore 
alternative possible futures. The cases are labelled A (High Growth), B (Middle Course), and 
C (Ecologically Driven). The key features of the three cases are summarised in Table 1. 
In the early stages of the study it became apparent that it was necessary to move beyond the 
formulation of three alternative cases. More possibilities opened up than originally anticipated 
and the three cases blossomed into six scenarios of energy supply systems alternatives. Three 
variants of Case A (Scenarios Al ,  A2 and A3) and two variants of Case C (Scenarios C 1 and C2) 
were developed. For the Midd.le Course Case B only one scenario was developed as it was 
designed to represent a future characterized by incremental and gradual changes. 
The three cases have a number of common features: 
world population grows in line with current medium projections by the World Bank, 
United Nations, and IIASA to about 10 billion in 2050 and approaching 12 billion in 
2100. It was felt that no useful purpose would be served in using high and low projection 
alternatives, particularly as these alternatives would divert attention from the main - 
energy oriented - thrust of the study. The World Bank's estimates have therefore been 
used; 
the world is divided into 11 regions (Figure I) ,  defined on the basis of geographical 
proximity, and similarity of economic and energy systems patterns. Most of the results 
are reported for three "macro-regions": the transitional economies of the Former Soviet 
Union and Central and Eastern Europe (labelled REFS); the current developing countries 
(DCs); and the industrialised countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD); 
social and economic development is substantial, particularly in "the South". During the 
next century, the current distinction between "developing" "and developed countries will 
become inappropriate as affluence increases throughout the world; 
energy efficiency improvements are steady and considerable, but not too far out of line 
with historic experience. Evidence of the past decade suggests modest expectations are 
justified until proven otherwise; 
the quantity and quality of energy services grows steadily as the drive for cleaner and 
more convenient fuels continues; 
formal top-down and bottom-up models have been used to check for internal consistency 
of the scenarios. 
The differences between the cases and their scenarios may be summarised as follows: 
Case A - High Growth 
Case A assumes high rates of economic growth and technological progress, a liberal international 
trading regime and preference for markets rather than detailed regulation. Economic growth 
is some 2% per annum in OECD countries, and double that figure in developing countries. 
This relatively high growth facilitates rapid turnover of capital stock and shifts in economic 
structures which promote efficiency improvements and technological advance. Towards the 
end of the 2 1 st century, average global per capita income in Case A would surpass the highest 
national levels observed today, indicating that current categorisations between "developed" and 
"developing" regions will become obsolete. 
As indicated, Case A is three pronged with respect to possible alternative energy systems 
developments: 
1 NAM North America 5 FSU Former Soviet Union 
2 LAM Latin America & the Caribbean 6 MEA Middle East & North Africa 9 SAS South Asia 
3 WEU Western Europe 7 AFR Sub-Saharan Africa 10 PAS Other Pacific Asia 
4 EEU Central & Eastern Europe 8 CPA Centrally Planned Asia & China 11 PA0 Pacific OECD 
Figure 1: IIASA and WEC study 11  world regions. 
A1 labelled "clean fossils" favors neither coal nor nuclear, but as a result of technological 
change sees the tapping of the vast potential of conventional and unconventional oil and 
gas resources. As a result, fossil fuel resources are sufficient to allow a smooth transition to 
alternative supply sources based on acceptable nuclear and new renewables, matched with 
high quality energy carriers in the form of electricity, liquids, gas and - later - hydrogen. 
Coal is regarded as a relatively unattractive "backstop" fossil fuel and continuously loses 
market share. 
A2 is labelled "dirty fossils". For a variety of reasons concerns about potential cli- 
mate change wither away, and coal's vast resources make it the fossil fuel of choice as 
conventional oil and gas resources dwindle. Local and regional sulphur and nitrogen 
emissions are controlled through add-on technologies, however challenges continue as 
coal is exploited at ever deeper and more remote locations, and conversion to synliquids 
is increasingly required. 
A3 is labelled "bio-nuc". Large-scale renewables and a new generation of nuclear power 
lead to a technology-driven transition to a post-fossil fuel age. The transition parallels 
that which occurred historically as industrialised countries moved from fuelwood through 
coal to oil and natural gas. In this scenario, natural gas is the transitional fossil fuel of 
choice, supported by economically competitive oil resources. There is little pressure to 
exploit non-conventional oil resources or large volumes of coal. By 2100 there is almost 
equal reliance on nuclear energy, natural gas, modern biomass, and a fourth category 
composed mostly of solar energy with smaller contributions from wind, geothermal, and 
a few oceanttidal schemes. 
Case B - Middle Course 
Case B is a single scenario, with more modest assumptions about economic growth, technological 
development, removal of trade barriers, and satisfaction of the development aspirations of the 
South than in Case A. Recent setbacks and slower economic restructuring than anticipated for 
the transitional economies, together with weak economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa 
and some other developing countries, are also reflected in the comparatively modest near-term 
economic growth assumptions of Case B. 
This case has the greatest reliance on fossil fuels of any scenario except the coal-intensive 
Scenario A2. Beyond 2020 the failure to match depleting fossil fuel resources with the necessary 
technological advances and exploration and production effort creates challenges for energy 
supply structures. There is pressure to move into costlier categories of unconventional resources 
and more remote conventional resources of fossil fuels; financial and environmental constraints 
loom increasingly large. 
This scenario may be seen as more "realistic", or a case of "muddling through". 
Case C - Ecologically Driven 
Case C is the most ambitious by being highly optimistic about technology diffusion and geopolit- 
ical innovations to meet the challenges of the environment and international equity. Substantial 
resource transfers from North to South recycle environmental taxes to spur growth in the South 
enabling wide participation in international environmental agreements and policies to reduce 
emissions from energy supply and end use. Globally, economic growth falls short of Case A 
but slightly surpasses that of Case B, allowing a substantial reduction in economic disparities. 
Case C incorporates policies which reduce carbon emissions to 2 GtC (gigatonnes carbon) by 
the end of the 21st century. These can either be achieved through economic instruments or 
effective command and control measures. Model checks confirm that the latter could create 
inefficiencies. It is believed that incentives rather than taxes - carrots rather than sticks - are 
more likely to get organisations and individuals to respond positively and quickly. 
In Case C nuclear energy is at a cross-roads illustrated by two scenarios. Scenario C l  assumes 
nuclear is a transient technology that is phased out entirely in the long term, leaving new 
renewable forms of energy to substitute for fossil fuels. Scenario C2 assumes a new generation 
of small-scale (200 to 400 MW) nuclear reactors is developed which is, and is also perceived to 
be, inherently safe. 
Each of these six scenarios covers the energy system as a whole from resource extraction to the 
provision of energy services. They are not simply energy supply or energy demand scenarios. 
KEY UNDERLYING ELEMENTS 
This summary paper cannot reproduce the richness of detail contained in the full study [I], but 
five salient elements are summarized here: 
population prospects; 
economic growth; 
energy intensity; 
technological advance; and 
the energy resource base. 
To the industrialisation process, which continues in many countries, have been added four 
further structural transformations: 
urbanisation; 
the transition from non-commercial to commercial forms of energy; 
more convenient, cleaner and flexible forms of energy - essentially increased "quality"; 
and 
decreasing energy intensity (the specific energy needs per unit of economic activity decline 
with economic development). 
These transformations began in  the most developed parts of the world, and have spread globally, 
but there remain significant differences between regions. Such structural shifts are generally 
least advanced in developing countries where population is expected to grow rapidly in future. 
POPULATION PROSPECTS 
A single medium projection of the world's population was assumed in the study (Figure 2) [3]. 
World population is expected to double in 70 years from 1990 to 10.6 billion in 2060. The 
last doubling took approximately 40 years. That means population growth is slowing, but the 
absolute increases will be larger than ever before. 
Most of this growth will occur in the present developing countries, or the "South". Not only 
will the energy consumption balance have shifted from North to South, the geopolitical balance 
may also have shifted in this direction. 
The rate of urbanisation will be even faster than the rate of population growth overall. Most of 
the largest cities of the world will be in the South. Highly urbanised populations have relatively 
high per capita energy consumption levels (they also have relatively high income levels). In 
the Ecologically Driven Case C urbanisation is assumed to proceed at a somewhat slower rate 
than in the other two cases because locally appropriate, small-scale new renewable sources of 
energy become available to rural communities and slow the urbanisation process. 
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Figure 2: World population, 1850 to 1990, and World Bank projection to 2100 [3], rural-urban 
(top) and by macroregion (bottom), in billion (lo9) people. Urbanization trends are based on 
UN [4] and Berry [5]. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The economic growth assumptions to 2050, by case and by region, are given in Table 2, placed in 
their historical context since 1850. Historical experience indicates both an uneven process across 
countries and over time, and a certain degree of convergence as less developed economies "catch 
up" with more developed ones. As a result, the scenarios assume that all countries and regions 
eventually achieve a "take-off" into accelerated economic development and industrialisation, 
and conditional convergence in long-term levels of economic development. 
The study develops further the calculation of economic growth based not simply on Gross Do- 
mestic Product calculated at market exchange rates (GDP,,,), but also calculated at purchasing 
power parities (GDP,,,). Purchasing power parities give a more accurate representation of the 
relative level of economic activities for economies that do not have a free market for foreign 
currency exchange. Furthermore it does not assume that domestic prices (e.g., for food in 
developing countries) are similar to international prices. Use of GDPppp modifies somewhat 
the wide disparities in income, wealth and consumption around the world. Under the GDP,,, 
Table 2: Economic growth rates, historical and 1990 to 2050 (%/yr). 
Historical Case 
mer PPP 1990-2020 2020-2050 
Since Since Since 
Region 1850 1950 1950 A B C A B C 
NAM 3.5 3.3 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.1 
WEU 2.4 3.7 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.1 
PA0 3.9 6.2 3.6 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 
EEU 2.1 3.9 2.4 2.3 0.9 1.3 4.6 3.6 3.2 
FSU 3.5 5.2 3.5 1.2 0.7 1.1 5.4 3.8 3.3 
CPA 2.9 6.1 4.3 7.2 5 .O 6.7 4.4 4.0 4.0 
SAS 2.0 4.5 3.1 3.9 3.6 3.7 4.6 3.5 4.3 
PAS n.a. 9.8 6.8 5.7 4.4 5.3 3.3 3.1 3.1 
MEA n.a. 4.6 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.9 3.0 3.0 
AFR n.a. 2.7 2.0 3.3 3 .O 3.1 4.7 3.5 3.9 
LAM 3.7 4.2 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 
World n.a 2.9 2.0 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.0 2.1 
Historical Data Sources: [6, 71. 
measure the richest 20% of the world's population produce and consume 80% of the world's 
product; under the GDP,,, measure the richest 20% consume "only" 60%. The distinction 
becomes particularly important when considering energy intensity differences among regions. 
ENERGY INTENSITY 
Energy intensity is a broad aggregate measure, linking energy consumption to units of economic 
activity. Energy intensities have tended to decline, in the USA and the UK, for instance, for 
some 125 to 150 years if total energy (non-commercial and commercial energy combined) is 
taken into account. If only commercial energy is considered, in the USA for example, the 
decline in energy intensity is postponed - until about 1920. Figure 3 provides historic changes 
in primary energy intensity for total energy (solid lines) and commercial energy only (dotted 
lines) for selected countries. For developing and reforming economies both GDP measures (at 
market exchange rates and at purchasing power parities) are provided. Thus India's total energy 
intensity has been declining quite sharply based on GDP,,,, but remains much higher than the 
more stable evolution at GDP,,,. Commercial energy intensity, on the other hand, is rising 
sharply on both GDP measures. 
It is assumed in the study that aggregate energy intensities generally improve over time but take 
account of the impact of commercial energy carriers substituting for traditional energy forms 
and technologies. Once that process is largely complete, commercial energy intensities decrease 
in line with the pattern found for- aggregate energy intensities in industrialised economies. There 
are, of course, persistent differences between countries and these reflect a range of historical 
circumstances, development histories, pricing and cultural patterns, including attitudes towards 
technology. Historically, energy intensity improvements tend to be path dependent, leading 
Intensity based on market exchange rates GDP, 
A A Intensity based on purchasing power parity GDPm FSU mer t 
India rner 7' 
Figure 3: Primary energy intensity for selected countries, total and commercial energy in kgoe 
per US(1990)$ GDP,,, and GDPppp. Data source: [8,9, 101 
only to conditional convergence between countries and regions over time, a hypothesis that is 
also incorporated into the scenarios presented here. 
The resulting global energy intensity improvement rates are 1.0% per annum for High Growth 
Case A, 0.8% per annum for Middle Course Case B, and 1.4% per annum for Economically 
Driven Case C. Fuller details are given in Tables 3 and 4. 
In comparing the energy intensity improvement rates presented here with other studies and 
earlier WEC cases, important definitional and measurement issues have to be kept in mind. 
These measurement issues are illustrated below for Case B (Middle Course) for three of our 11 
world regions, giving energy intensity improvement rates (percent per year) to 2020 for total 
primary energy (TPE) and commercial primary energy (CPE), and for market exchange rate 
GDP,,, and purchasing power GDPppp respectively. 
The dynamics of energy intensity improvements change drastically for developing regions as 
exemplified by Centrally Planned Asia and China and Sub-Saharan Africa. The generally 
higher energy intensity improvements for Centrally Planned Asia and China are the result 
of the much higher short-term economic growth rates for Centrally Planned Asia and China 
than Sub-Saharan Africa; higher GDP growth leading to faster turnover of capital stock yields 
faster energy intensity improvements in the scenarios. Thus, the evolution of the total primary 
energy consumption per GDP,,, yields a challenging numerical magnitude of energy intensity 
Table 3: Three scenarios of energy intensity improvements (primary energy per GDP,,,, %/yr). 
Case 
OECD -1.2 
REFS -2.1 
DCS -1.6 
World -1 .O 
aRange of WEC Commission's Report on Energy for Tomorrow's World 121. Improvement rates not directly 
comparable as based on purchasing power parity (ppp). It should be emphasized that the WEC Commission 
specifically rejected adoption of any "business-as-usual"cases, and noted that in recent years groups of industrialized 
countries have achieved overall energy intensity reductions exceeding 1.5% per year (e.g., the European Union 
since 1974) and exceeding 2.5% per year if road transportation is excluded. But what can be achieved by a few 
countries over a relatively short period, and what can be achieved by many over a long period, may be two very 
different things. 
Table 4: Energy intensity improvements 1990-2020 for three regions (%/yr). 
Region TPEIGDP,,,, TPEIGDP,,, CPEIGDP,,, CPEIGDP,,, 
NAM -1.2 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 
CPA 
SAS 
TPE - Total primary energy 
CPE - Commercial primary energy 
"NAM - North America 
b~~~ - Centrally Planned Asia and China 
'SAS -South Asia 
improvements. Conversely, commercial energy intensity measured per GPDppp assume positive 
values, i.e., commercial energy consumption grows at least as fast as GDPppp in Case B. 
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE 
The full report [ l ]  devotes considerable space to the dynamics of technical progress and to 
technological innovation and diffusion drawing on IIASA's data bank of 1,400 technologies. 
Technological change, together with economic structural change, is an important driving force 
for the evolution of energy intensity. 
The three cases assume different rates of technological progress and learning, and the varying 
impact of related features such as the relevance of international trade requirements for some 
technologies and the scope for local development and manufacture of others. In all cases, energy 
options which are not technically feasible today are excluded. Nuclear fusion, for example, is 
excluded. Hydrogen as an energy carrier is included, because it can be produced with current 
technologies though not at current commercial costs. 
In Case A (High Growth) there is substantial advance in all new energy production, conversion 
and end-use technologies. These advances are demonstrated across the board: for hydrocarbon 
Table 5: Global fossil and nuclear energy reserves, resources and occurrences, in Gtoe. 
Consumption Resource Additional 
1850-1 990 1990 Reserves Resourcesa baseb occurrences 
oil 
Conventional 90 3.2 150 145 295 
Unconventional - - 193 332 525 1,900 
Natural gas 
Conventional 4 1 1.7 141 279 420 
Unconventional - - 192 258 450 400 
Hydrates - - - - - 18,700 
Coal 125 2.2 606 2,794 3,400 3,000 
Totalc 256 7.0 1,282 3,808 5,090 24,000 
Uranium 17 0.5 57 203 260 150 
in F B R S ~  - - 3,390 12,150 15,550 8,900 
Source: [ l ]  
- negligible amounts; blanks, data not available. 
"Resources to be discovered or developed to reserves. 
b ~ e s o u r c e  base is the sum of reserves and resources. 
'All totals have been rounded. 
d ~ a s t  breeder reactors. 
exploration and extraction; nuclear electricity generation and hydrogen; renewable sources 
of electricity generation and biofuel production and conversion; and for advanced end-use 
conversion technologies such as fuel cells. 
In Case B (Midd.le Course) the advances are less substantial than in Case A, reflecting less 
concerted research, development and diffusion efforts. In Case B technological change largely 
focuses on incremental improvements of existing technologies. 
Case C (Ecologically Driven) strongly favours low-carbon fossil and renewable energy supply 
and high efficiency end-use technologies. Technologies in these sectors benefit from improve- 
ments rates equal to those in Case A. Technological developments in other energy sectors 
develop more slowly, as in Case B. 
THE ENERGY RESOURCE BASE 
The resource base used for the study includes all potentially recoverable coal, conventional oil 
and natural gas, unconventional oil (shale, tar sands and heavy crudes), and unconventional 
natural gas (gas in Devonian shale, tight sand formations, geopressurised aquifers and coal 
seams). Quantities not considered potentially recoverable are classified as "additional occur- 
rences", and are excluded from the resource base. Hence they are not taken into account in 
the cases/scenarios presented here. The quantities of such occurrences as methane hydrates in 
tundra regions and in the sea, and natural uranium dissolved in sea water, are huge. Table 5 
provides the details. 
Numerous sources have been drawn upon in building up Table 5, including IIASA and WEC, 
which are acknowledged in the full study [I]. 
The availability of the fossil fuel and uranium resource base varies across the cases and scenarios. 
It ranges from optimistic in Case A (Scenarios A1 and A3), through cautious (Scenario A2 
and Case B), to conservative (Case C). As mentioned above, none of the scenarios assume any 
"additional occurrences" are brought on stream, but they do indicate the hypothetical availability 
of enormous quantities. 
The fossil fuel resource figures given in Table 5 are certainly sufficient for more than 100 years, 
even in the highest Case A scenarios. This is not to suggest that temporary or structural 
energy shortages cannot occur, simply there are no basic geological constraints. There are 
likely to be other barriers to using such large quantities of fossil energy: technical, financial 
and environmental. For instance, cumulative carbon emissions of the full exploitation of fossil 
resources would correspond to 6 to 7-times the current atmospheric C 0 2  concentration, which 
now approaches 360 ppmv (parts per million by volume). Local environmental impacts could 
also be chronic in many parts of the world (see discussion below). 
The use of uranium in the future will depend in part upon the resolution of current controversies 
surrounding operational safety, waste disposal and proliferation; and in part on the successful 
development of new technologies. 
Renewable energy resources (with the exception of a few hydropower sites) offer much lower 
energy densities than the fossil fuels. They are limited, therefore, not by the magnitude of their 
energy flows (that are huge by any standards) but by how these flows can be harnessed and 
converted to fuels to provide energy services. This implies not only appropriate technology and 
finance, but also the resolution of potential local environmental impacts. 
Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the Earth annually intercepts about 130,000 Gtoe (gigatonnes 
oil equivalent) of solar energy compared with current total global energy consumption of about 9 
Gtoe. This is one reason why it is not unlikely that, in the long run, the more direct uses of solar 
energy from photovoltaics to solar thermal will account for the major part of renewable energy. 
A second reason is that other forms of renewable energy may either have unacceptable local 
environmental impacts when pursued on a large scale (plantation biomass) or when pursued in 
particular locations (beautiful landscapes, sensitive estuaries, rare natural habitats). 
The key issue, therefore, is what fraction of renewable energy flows can and will be harnessed for 
the energy purposes of future generations of people. The WEC's reports Energy for Tomorrow's 
World [2] and New Renewable Energy Resources: A Guide to the Future i l l ] ,  identified 
renewable energy potentials by the year 2100 of up to 13 Gtoe, of which 10 Gtoe could be 
supplied by "new" renewables - modern biomass, solar, wind, geothermal, oceanltidal, and 
small hydropower (under 10 MW). 
Progress towards that longer-term potential is, however, likely to be slow - particularly with 
current policies. Major, effective and internationally coordinated policy support would be 
required if developments are to be accelerated over the next two or three decades. In the longer 
term, nevertheless, the potentials for renewables increase significantly as technology and both 
absolute and relative cost improvements takes place in the scenarios. 
PROSPECTS FOR ENERGY SYSTEMS 
The energy system is service driven from the bottom-up, while energy flows are resource and 
conversion process driven from the top-down. Energy flows from energy sources to end-use, 
and driving forces from population growth to technological change, interact intimately. In the 
study, therefore, the dichotomy between supply and demand has been replaced with the broader 
perspective foreshadowed in the WEC's report Energy for Tomorrow's World: ". . . the energy 
community is the captive of its own technology in continuing to use these distinctive terms in 
ways which fail to recognise them as elements of .  . . a system which should be driven not by the 
exigencies of primary energy supply, trade or the energy market but by the end-point services 
which energy is the means of providing" [2 p. 2461. The scenarios here are therefore described 
in terms of primary and final energy consumption. Primary energy depicts the structure of 
energy extraction and conversion, while final energy shows the structure of energy end-use. 
The six scenarios are intended to illustrate the possibilities arising out of steps taken to develop 
new energy technologies, energy resources and financial institutions over a time period, guided 
by policy and end-use objectives which permit a range of outcomes. There is also time to 
achieve capital turnover and fundamental change in the energy system. By 2020, many current 
energy end-use devices will have been replaced by those just being introduced for commercial 
use today or those on the near horizon - new vehicles, industrial processes and heating systems, 
and parts of the housing stock and infrastructures. Many power plants will have been replaced, 
and others will be nearing the end of their useful lifetimes. The time horizon to 2050 and on 
to 2100 means that all energy technologies and devices are likely to have been replaced at least 
twice, and most energy infrastructures as well. Such turnover offers enormous new supply and 
end-use opportunities reflected in the scenarios of the study. 
PRIMARY ENERGY 
Figure 4 illustrates world primary energy use and world population growth from 1850 to the 
present time, together with the six scenarios grouped into three cases, labelled A, B, and C. 
Primary energy requirements of the scenarios within each case are almost identical (see Table 6). 
The three cases indicate that global primary energy use would increase up to 3-fold by 2050, and 
2 to 5-fold by 2100. Case A (High Growth) portrays primary energy growth rates approaching 
those of the historical experience since 1850, while Cases B (Middle Course) and C (Ecologically 
Driven) present substantially lower growth. Case C in particular represents a radical change, 
with emphasis on energy efficiency and conservation that results in a clear decoupling of energy 
and economic growth. 
The current developing countries account for the overwhelming proportion of the increase in 
global primary energy requirements. Energy demands increase modestly in the industrialised 
North in Case A, grow marginally in Case B, and actually decline in Case C. 
Table 6 sets out the basic figures by 2050 for primary energy supply and demand, the fuel mix, 
and final energy demand of the six scenarios. Investment and emissions implications are also 
provided, topics dealt with below in this paper. 
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Figure 4: Global primary energy use (Gtoe), 1850 to present, and in the three cases to 2100. 
The insert shows global population growth, 1850 to present, and its projection [3] to 2100, in 
billions (lo9) of people. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the changing primary energy mix of the six scenarios. Figure 7 provides 
the cumulative fossil fuel requirements, 1990 to 2050 for the six scenarios. Figure 8 shows the 
converging structure of final energy use of the cases/scenarios. 
Common to all six sceilarios is that the peak of the fossil era has passed. Fossil fuel consumption 
will grow more slowly than total primary energy needs. Even in Case A, Scenarios A1 and A2, 
the share of fossil energy declines after 2020. The two most important transitional fuels - oil 
and natural gas - face declining shares during the next century. In absolute volumes, however, 
requirements increase considerably compared to current levels. 
The scenarios suggest that the world may now only be one-third of the way through the oil age; 
and one-fifth through the natural gas age. Even the low coal Case C scenarios suggest that as 
much coal will be used between 1990 and 2050 as was used between 1850 and 1990. Views that 
these energy scenarios threaten the immediate or early demise of oil, gas or coal are therefore 
seriously misplaced. 
The three variants of the high growth Case A result in between 1,300 and 2,000 Gtoe of fossil 
energy being consumed by 2100 of which oil and gas comprise 900 to 1,200 Gtoe. This relates 
to the 1,300 Gtoe fossil reserves figure given in Table 5 and to a fossil resources figure of some 
3,800 Gtoe. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of primary energy shares, 1850 to 2100, for Case A: A1 Scenario, the 
coal-intensive A2 Scenario, and the "bio-nuc" A3 Scenario. 
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Table 6: Characteristics of three cases and their six scnearios for the world in 2050. 
Case 
Primary energy, in Gtoe 25 25 25 20 14 14 
Primary energy mix, % 
Coal 24 3 2 9 2 1 11 10 
Oil 30 19 18 20 19 18 
Gas 24 22 32 23 27 24 
Nuclear 6 4 11 14 4 12 
Renewables 16 23 30 22 3 9 3 6 
Resource use 1990-2050, in Gtoe 
Coal 235 3 24 180 226 143 141 
Oi 1 323 302 284 257 210 210 
Gas 24 1 247 285 227 210 197 
Energy sector investment US$ 10'' 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 
US$/toe supplied 50 67 47 5 6 50 50 
as % of GWPa 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.9 
Final energy, in Gtoe 17 17 17 14 10 10 
Final energy mix, % 
Solids 
Liquids 
Electricity 
Other 
Emissions 
sulfur"ld, MtS 
~ i t r o ~ e n ~ ,  MtN 
Carbon, GtC 
aGross World Product 
b ~ i s t r i c t  heat, gas, and hydrogen. 
'Unabated sulfur emissions in Case A could be three (Al) to five (A2) times higher leading to unacceptable local 
and regional environmental impacts. 
d~reliminary global estimates. 
In all scenarios there is also a significant expansion of renewables, but the driving forces vary. 
Case B represents the most cautious assessment of renewables' prospects. Over the longer- 
term, however, renewables expand at a steady pace in all scenarios. Even in Case B renewables 
contribute 22% (4.4 Gtoe) of world primary energy consumption by 2050, and 33% (1 I Gtoe) by 
2100. In Case C and Scenario A3, renewables reach as much as 22 Gtoe by 2100, with biomass 
assumed to contribute over 8 Gtoe which raises doubts about its viability due to competing land 
uses and local environmental impacts, as well as the competitiveness of other energy sources. 
These issues are discussed in more detail in the full report of the study [I]. 
Scenario A3 also requires up to 75 new nuclear reactors per year to 2050, which implies that 
public opinion has become convinced of the safety and general acceptability of nuclear power 
generation. In Scenario C2, nuclear power grows to a market share of 12% worldwide by 2050 
Coal Oil Gas 
Figure 7: Cumulative fossil energy requirements, 1990 to 2050, in Gtoe. 
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Figure 8: World supply of final energy by form: solids (coal and biomass), liquids (oil products 
and methanollethanol), and grids (gas, district heat, electricity, and hydrogen). Overlapping 
shaded areas indicate variations across Cases A, B, and C. 
and 19% by 2100 on the basis of new, small-scale, decentralised technologies. In the absence of 
radical improvements in public acceptability, technology and economics, nuclear energy might 
prove a transient technology, as illustrated in Scenario C l .  
Relatively rapid and substantial technological change accompanies the comparatively high 
economic growth and energy requirements of the Case A scenarios. Scenario A1 assumes 
that this technological change permits the utilisation of large volumes of both conventional 
and non-conventional oil and gas resources, higher energy efficiency, and mitigation of most 
environmental impacts. Fossil fuels still account for about 50% of primary energy consumption 
in the year 2 100. Scenario A2 is more conservative about technological change and resource 
availability, the main explanation for why this scenario is more coal intensive. Scenario A3 is 
"technology intensive", but here new renewable energy sources and new nuclear technologies 
combine to permit the transition to a post-fossil age. By 2100 in Scenario A3, fossil fuels 
account for 30% of world primary energy consumption; almost all of this is supplied by natural 
gas. 
The single scenario Case B (Middle Course) is more cautious in respect of economic growth, 
energy availability and technological change. Fossil fuels still account for about 45% of world 
primary energy consumption in 2100 but unless rather dramatic changes occur to bring in new 
fossil fuel discoveries or the rapid expansion of non-fossil energy sources then resource scarcities 
become likely. Financing and environmental constraints are likely to be particularly severe in 
this case as more remote and dirty fossil fuel resources need to be exploited and converted to 
synfuels on a large scale. 
The (Ecologically Driven) Case C scenarios offer the greatest challenges, but also opportunities, 
as the emphasis shifts to accelerating energy efficiency, encouraging energy conservation wher- 
ever appropriate, and promoting new, decentralised and environmentally benign technologies. 
In addition to the vigorous control of local and regional pollutants, a global regime to control the 
emissions of greenhouse gases is established. The goal is to reduce anthropogenic C02  emission 
levels to 2 GtC by 2 100 (corresponding to one-third their current level). This is anticipated to 
lead to eventual stabilization of atmospheric C02 concentrations. 
Case C outlines pathways for achieving the transition from the current dominance of fossil fuels 
to the dominance of renewable energy flows. By 2050 renewables account for 40% of world 
energy consumption, a share that increases to over 80% by 2100. Efficiency and environmental 
criteria require a high quality of energy carriers delivered to end-users. Renewable energy 
sources are therefore transformed into electricity, liquid and gaseous energy carriers. Fossil 
fuels are transitional fuels of rapidly diminishing significance. Nuclear energy is at a cross- 
roads in Case C, with new nuclear energy staging something of a revival in Scenario C2. In 
Scenario C l  nuclear energy is a transient technology that becomes virtually phased out by 2100. 
All of the scenarios illustrate an expected drive by consumers for more flexible, more convenient 
and cleaner final energy forms. 
FINAL ENERGY 
Electricity is already an important energy carrier, and its contribution increases in all six scenar- 
ios. Methanol is also expected to play a larger role in the future. Hydrogen is another energy 
carrier expected - eventually - to play a significant role, but mainly post-2050 as considerable 
time is required to improve its economics and build-up a hydrogen infrastructure. Overall, the 
pattern of final energy use is remarkably consistent - and converging - across all scenarios. 
The most obvious shift is from energy used in its original form - whether traditional biomass 
or coal, etc., - to elaborate systems of energy conversion and delivery. Energy delivered by 
pipelines and networks plays an increasing role. 
There are some important implications for energy efficiency in  these shifts, and challenges to 
traditional conventions and definitions. Hydropower for instance, is converted into electricity at 
actual efficiencies approaching 90% but a standard convention bases the conversion efficiency 
on the amount of fossil fuel that would have been required to produce the same amount of 
electricity - the "substitution method. This reduces hydropower efficiency to an average 
of 38.5%, a definition used by the WEC [2] for all non-fossil sources of electricity. The 
more elaborate energy conversion systems become the more significant this difference is. The 
conventional accounting approach has been used in the study, but produces relatively low results 
with strong implications for renewable energy (photovoltaic efficiency is reduced to 18% if solar 
is considered a primary energy input, wind energy becomes even more problematic). 
FINANCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS 
Financing 
The financing requirements of the energy prospects given in all three cases are clearly enormous. 
The problems of financing energy development are already of great concern in  many developing 
countries. The growing difficulties in accessing official financial assistance from multilateral 
bodies, institutional barriers, inappropriate pricing policies and poor investment returns all give 
cause for concern. Nevertheless, 3 to 4% of GDP is invested in the energy sectors, a ratio which 
is expected to remain fairly stable; and savings rates are about 24% on average in developing 
countries and 20% in transitional economies. Therefore, provided the necessary institutional and 
pricing adjustments are made, and returns on investment become sufficiently attractive, there 
seems no fundamental reason why the finance for energy investments should not be forthcoming. 
The availability of international financing will also be affected by how the international trading 
regime develops. Case A (High Growth) assumes a strong drive towards free trade; Case B 
(Middle Course) incorporates continuing trade barriers, but none which greatly affect energy 
trade; and Case C (Ecologically Driven) makes international trade conditional on satisfaction of 
sustainable development objectives and whether projects and technologies satisfy the emerging 
environmental standards. In Case A, therefore, financing is attracted to where there is political 
stability, relatively high returns on investment and attractive growth prospects, regardless of the 
nature of political regimes. Political considerations and regional bloc trading regimes have their 
greatest influence in Case B. Financing of approved technologies and environmentally-sound 
energy sources and schemes is not a problem in Case C, but other investments would be heavily 
regulated. 
Table 7 provides the study's estimate for cumulative investments in energy supply and conversion 
by region and by scenario, for the period 1990-2020 and 2020-2050. 
These estimates, by convention, include capital for production capacity, for transmission and 
distribution infrastructures, and for complying with environmental standards. They do not in- 
clude investments in end-use technologies, which are traditionally counted as durable consumer 
goods or business investments. However, the fact that the performance of end-use technologies 
plays such an important role in  all cases and scenarios in the study, suggests the need for a 
new approach in evaluating energy sector investments. Integrated resource planning, for exam- 
Table 7: Cumulative investments in energy supply by region, 1990-2020 and 2020-2050. 
Case 
Energy A" B cb 
investments 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 
Cumulative 
in trillion US$(1990) 
OECD 
REFs 
DCs 
World 
As share of GDP 
(in percent) 
OECD 
REFs 
DCs 
World 
Per unit of primary 
energy US$(1990)/toe 
OECD 
REFs 
DCs 
World 
'A l scenario; b~ 1 scenario. 
ple, has begun to extend the traditional energy perspective to take into account investments in 
end-use technologies. 
Between 2020 and 2050, capital requirements grow substantially in absolute terms, but still 
more slowly than GDP in all scenarios. There is a shift from supply-side investments (included 
in Table 7) to end-use technology and infrastructure investments (which are excluded). If the 
latter had been included in the table the numbers are likely to have been greater by at least 50%. 
There are also advances along the technological learning curve and continued improvements in  
energy intensity which are reflected in the figures of the study (and which tend to reduce future 
investment needs markedly). 
The results given in Table 7 indicate arange of cumulative capital requirements between 1990 and 
2020 of US$13 to 20 x 1012 ($1990). For comparison, the latter figure equals the world GDP of 
the year 1990. The developing region's share rises sharply from today's 25 to 30% to between 
42% and 48%, and becomes the largest energy capital investment market in all three cases. 
Considering energy investments as a share of "macro-region" GDP, the transitional economies 
rank the highest with 7 to 9% of regional GDP devoted to energy investments. Obsolete energy 
structures and slow economic revival are the background. Developing countries invest 3 to 4% 
of GDP in the energy sector, and the OECD region invests about 1 %. 
Annual capital requirements rise from under US$400x lo9 in 1990 to US$500x lo9 - 
US$750 x lo9 (US$1990) by 2020, and to US$700 to 1200x 1 o9 (US$1990) by 2050. A large 
share of this investment will still need to be externally financed. 
Environmental Impacts 
Three kinds of environmental impacts have been considered in the study and are addressed in 
more detail in the main study report [I]: local impacts of indoor and urban air pollution in 
developing countries; regional impacts of sulphur and nitrogen emissions and their potential 
contribution to acidification; and greenhouse gas emissions, particularly C02,  and their potential 
contribution to enhanced global warming. 
Local Impacts 
There are two important categories of local pollution. First, that arising from poverty: such as 
poor sanitation, polluted water, high levels of indoor air pollution caused by burning traditional 
fuels - impacting with particular severity on women, children and the elderly - and high 
concentrations of particulate matter in urban areas. Secondly, pollution of modern origins: 
resulting from dense motorised traffic and from low-efficiency coal combustion in electricity 
generating plants, industrial premises and homes. Concentrations of suspended particulate 
matter, lead, volatile organic compounds, tropospheric ozone and sulphur dioxide widely exceed 
World Health Organization guidelines, particularly in urban areas. 
The study reaches the following conclusions: 
improving conversion efficiencies in end-use devices has a key role to play in conserving 
traditional resources such as fuelwood and reducing indoor air pollution; 
structural shifts away from traditional energy end-use patterns and energy carriers towards 
more efficient modern conversion technologies and cleaner energy carriers are urgently 
necessary; 
there will need to be a long-term shift towards energy services provided through clean, 
grid-dependent fuels. 
Environmental constraints, together with increasing affluence, are expected to lead to a long- 
term convergence of energy end-use systems and infrastructures in the direction of convenient 
and clean energy forms across the scenarios presented here, despite diverging energy supply 
structures. Local solutions to local problems need to come forward, appropriate in nature and 
scale to local circumstances, until the more long-term structural changes towards clean energy 
end-use carriers yield noticeable effects on improvements in local environmental quality. There 
are variations among the scenarios in their environmental impacts, however, Scenario A2 and 
Case B - both relatively coal intensive - arouse the gravest concern. 
Regional Impacts 
Energy emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NO,) have both local and 
regional impacts. Acid deposition is of particular concern. 
IIASA's RAINS model [12, 131 was used to calculate unabated scenarios of sulphur deposition 
in Europe and in South and East Asia. The analysis was carried out for the coal-intensive 
Scenario A2 and for the Case C scenarios. 
In Scenario A2, in the absence of sulphur abatement, sulphur emissions in Europe would 
increase by approximately 50% over the next 30 years. Sulphur deposition would exceed 
16 gS/m2 per year in large areas of Central, Western and Northern Europe. This contrasts 
to the requirements of the Second Sulphur Protocol on Transboundary Air Pollution of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which calls for reduction measures to lower 
maximum excess deposition to below 3 g ~ / m 2  per year. 
In the rapidly growing economies of Asia the situation is even more dramatic. In the unabated 
Scenario A2, SO2 emissions in South and East Asia triple by 2020 in the absence of abatement 
measures. It should be noted that the implications of current national energy projections exceed 
even this pessimistic scenario. 
In the unabated Scenario A2 ambient air quality in South and East Asia deteriorates significantly 
in both urban and rural areas, with sulphur deposition reaching double the worst levels ever 
observed in the most polluted areas of Central and Eastern Europe. Deposition exceeds the 
"critical loads" for most of the ecosystems in the region, where "critical loads" are defined as 
the maximum deposition levels at which ecosystems can function sustainably. The significance 
of these findings is that, in the absence of emissions abatement, critical loads for economically 
important food crops in Asia under Scenario A2 are expected to be exceeded by factors up to 
10. 
Given these results, the scenarios of the study all incorporate only advanced coal technology, 
including scrubbers for new electricity generation capacity. Sulphur emissions are therefore 
significantly lower than in the unabated case. For Case A, European emissions in 2020 are 
between 13 and 15 million tonnes of SO2 compared to 30 million tonnes in the unabated case. 
For Asia, Case A emissions in 2020 range from 25 to 45 million tonnes of SO2, compared to 
over 80 million tonnes for the unabated case. 
Further emission reductions are feasible, but would require substantial additional investment 
requirements in the Case A scenarios. For the Case C scenarios, energy demand is much 
lower due to conservation efforts and much less sulphur-containing fossil fuel is used. This 
would keep the growth of unabated SO2 in Asia over the next two decades below a factor 
of 2. Consequently, less stringent abatement measures are required and could be focused more 
economically on specific local "hot spots". Overall, sulphur emissions in Case C can be kept at, 
or slightly below, 1990 levels with control costs under half those required in Scenario A2. 
These results indicate that in Asia concerns about sulphur emissions, and their potential regional 
impacts on food security, will take precedence over global, long-term environmental issues 
such as potential climate change. Nitrogen emissions are likely to have much the same relative 
priority. 
Figure 9: Global energy-related carbon emissions, 1850 to 1990, and for three scenario families 
to 2100, in GtC. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
The study concentrated on future C 0 2  emissions, as the dominant greenhouse gas, for each of 
the six scenarios as implied by their level of energy consumption and structure of energy supply. 
Figure 9 shows the results. 
C 0 2  emissions vary substantially between the scenarios. In the coal-intensive Scenario A2 they 
reach 22 GtC (gigatonnes elemental carbon) in 2 100, in Scenario A1 15 GtC, but in Scenario A3 
significant structural change in the energy system reduces the figure to 7 GtC. The latter is about 
the same level as current global energy-related carbon emissions, yet the energy consumption 
would have risen 5-fold. Case B's emissions are comparable to those of Scenario A3 up to 
2050, but are nearly double by 2100. The two scenarios of Case C were constrained to stabilise 
emissions at current levels again by 2050, in order to achieve an emission ceiling of 2 GtC 
(one-third their current level) by 2 100. 
The resulting cumulative carbon emissions, considered of particular relevance for potential 
climate change, from the study are compared in Table 8 to earlier WEC scenarios [2] and to 
comparable emission scenarios of the IPCC [14, 151. 
In contrast to many other scenarios, which combine optimism about high economic growth with 
pessimism about technological change, resource availability (except for coal production) and 
efficiency improvements, the scenarios presented here offer a more consistent range of possible 
futures. 
The atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations and surface temperature warming that might result from the 
scenario emissions were calculated using a carbon cycle and climate model developed by Wigley 
Table 8: Cumulative emissions 1990-2 100 (GtC): IPCC and WEC scenarios compared." 
IPCC/IS92 emissions 
scenarios 
WEC Cases: "Energy for 
Tomorrow's World, 1993 
IIASA and WEC Cases "Long-Term 
Energy Perspectives" 
1995 
"On comparable world population assumptions (UN medium projection). 
[16]. Figure 10 provides the results of the model used for atmospheric C 0 2  concentration for 
the six scenarios. By 2100 the two Case C scenarios achieve an atmospheric C 0 2  concentration 
below 420 ppmv (parts per million by volume); Case B is below 580 ppmv; and the three 
Case A scenarios are below 520 ppmv (A3), 610 ppmv (Al), and 730 ppmv (A2). Thus only 
Scenario A2 exceeds the IPCC's "preferred" scenario, IS92a. 
There are considerable uncertainties surrounding the implications of such concentration in- 
creases for temperature change (as indicated for Case B in Figure 10). For the Case C scenarios 
global mean surface temperature rise at 2100 might be less than 1.5"C from today's level; the 
Case A scenarios and Case B about +2.0 to +2.5"C. 
These results indicate that, if the current state of knowledge about the radiative forcing due to 
anthropogenic activities is well-founded, the energy sector is indeed a major stake holder. Even 
in the Case C scenarios the energy sector would account for 40% of all long-term changes in 
radiative forcing (including agriculture and deforestation). In Scenario A3 the corresponding 
figure is 50%, and in Scenario A2 80%. 
CONCLUSIONS 
All six scenarios analyzed in the study outline the following convergent and pervasive develop- 
ments: increasing demand for energy services together with population growth and economic 
development; increasing quality and environmental compatibility of final energy forms; a shift 
in the global balance of economic activity and energy use from North to South; the availability 
and reliance on fossil fuels for many decades to come. 
Technological progress and appropriate investment to match energy sources to the desire for 
more flexible, convenient and clean forms of energy required to service consumer needs are of 
crucial importance, but several decades of turnover of capital stock will be required to achieve 
that match. In the meantime, unless the long-term goal is itself matched by the appropriate 
policies and investment decisions it will become even harder and more costly to change course. 
Figure 10: C 0 2  concentrations (ppmv), 1950 to 2100, and global mean temperature change 
("C), 1990 to 2100. The (substantial) model uncertainties are indicated for Case B. 
Investment decisions to 2020 are, therefore, an important concern - and not simply because of 
the tremendous sums of money involved. 
Assumptions made elsewhere, that high energy demand growth and limited technological and 
financial progress are consistent, are questioned in the study. Strict international environmental 
policy measures (including limits on C02 emissions) and policies to promote international 
equity (Ecologically Driven - Case C) prove also consistent with substantial economic growth 
and energy development. Although individual countries or sectors may suffer from constraints, 
the overall result can be a positive sum game, and potential losses can be reduced or averted by 
strategies to diversify out of activities in long-run decline. 
All scenarios show, for instance, that the international oil and natural gas industries are still 
far from being half-way through their life cycle in terms of volumes extracted and used; even 
for coal the most hostile scenarios indicate a prospective lifetime of several decades. Thus all 
three cases, all six scenarios, reflect substantial growth for all energy industries to at least 2020. 
The coming decades will see much reshuffling within and among energy sectors. Many new 
business opportunities will arise linked to cleaner and more convenient fuels, to liquid rather 
than solid fuels, to grid and other interconnected supplies, and to more locally appropriate - 
often small scale - energy sources and conversion technologies. 
However, the scenarios indicate prospects will diverge after 2020, with different energy indus- 
tries embarked on often mutually exclusive development paths. Coal, despite its huge resource 
base, could be particularly threatened - due to increased competition from other energy sources 
and due to environmental constraints. By contrast the oil industry, and the natural gas industry 
to an even greater extent, have a long future ahead. New markets will have to be developed for 
traditional fuels, recognising that the shift from selling energy to marketing energy services will 
continue and intensify. 
The central message across all six scenarios is that energy end-use patterns are converging 
towards cleaner, more flexible and convenient energy forms, while energy systems structures 
are diverging as a result of emerging opportunities and the availability of policy choices. 
Although the structural changes in the near term will be modest, the seeds of long-term changes 
need to be initiated now. The near term investments embodied in both capital stock and 
knowledge (research and development, and technology) will shape which of the divergent 
long-term alternatives will be taken, and which ones will be precluded. 
The study has identified patterns that are robust across a purposely broad range of scenarios. It 
has also identified the conditions under which energy systems structures diverge into alternative 
directions. But no analysis can ever turn an uncertain future into a sure thing. 
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APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY 
Reproducibility of results adds to their validity. This is especially the case when presenting 
long-term scenarios for which there are no established, rigorous validity proofs. A necessary - 
though not sufficient - condition for reproducibility is a good description of the methods that 
produced the results. This appendix presents a summary description of the methods used in the 
study, and references where more complete descriptions can be found. 
The analysis started with two principal exogenous variables: population growth by region, and 
per capita economic growth by region. Levels of primary and final energy consumption were 
derived using a model developed at IIASA labeled simply Scenario Generator (SG) [17]. It 
is essentially a combination of an extensive data base of historical data on national economies 
and their energy systems, and empirically estimated equations of past economic and energy 
developments. 
For each of the scenarios, the SG generated plausible future paths of energy use consistent 
with historical data and with the specific features that were specified for the scenarios, e.g., 
high or moderate economic growth, rapid or more gradual energy intensity improvements, 
technological development across the board, or high development in green technologies and 
slower development for fossil fuels. 
Two other models were then used in an iterative mode for testing for consistency among all 
the pieces of each scenario. A model of energy-economy interactions called 11R was used 
to check for consistency between a region's macroeconomic development and its energy use. 
11R is a modified version of Global 2100, originally published in 1992 [18], and subsequently 
used widely in energy studies throughout the world. IIASA's energy supply model called 
MESSAGE I11 provided detailed estimates of energy demand and supply [19,20]. MESSAGE I11 
is a dynamic linear optimization model, calculating cost-minimal supply structures under the 
constraints of resource availability, the menu of given technologies, and the demand for useful 
energy. Both models use a discount rate of 5% per annum. The two models are used in tandem 
because they correspond to the two different perspectives from which energy modelling is 
usually done: top-down (1 IR) and bottom-up (MESSAGE 111). The model-linking methodology 
is described in [2 11. 
The regional acidification impacts were calculated using IIASA's RAINS model [12, 131. It is a 
modular simulation model with sections to calculate: (I) emissions from given levels of activity 
in the energy sector and energy end uses; (2) subsequent atmospheric transport and chemical 
transformations of those emissions; (3) deposition; and (4) ecological impacts. The latter are 
calculated based on a spatial resolution of grid cells of 150 km side length. 
The impacts of energy biomass production on land use and potential conflicts with food produc- 
tion were calculated using IIASA's Basic Linked System (BLS) of national agricultural models 
[22, 231. BLS consists of sectorially disaggregated macroeconomic models with detailed agri- 
cultural production functions that account for all major inputs (land, fertilizer, capital, and. labor) 
required for the production of 11 agricultural commodities. 
APPENDIX 11: ACRONYMS 
AFR - 
BLS - 
bbl - 
co2 - 
C02DB - 
CPA - 
CPE - 
DCs - 
EEU - 
FSU - 
GDP - 
GDPm,, - 
GDPPPP 
GNP 
GtC - 
Gtoe - 
GWP - 
IIASA - 
IND - 
IPCC - 
kgoe - 
LAM - 
MEA - 
MESSAGE I11 - 
- 
MW - 
Mtoe - 
mer - 
NAM - 
OECD - 
PA0 - 
PAS - 
PE - 
PPmv - 
PPP - 
RAINS - 
REFS 
SAS - 
SG - 
so2 - 
TPE - 
UN - 
UNDP - 
WEC - 
WEU - 
WHO - 
11R - 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Basic Linked System model, IIASA 
barrels (oil equivalent, 1 toe = 7 bbl) 
carbon dioxide 
The IIASA Carbon Dioxide Mitigation Technology Database 
Centrally Planned Asia and China 
commercial primary energy 
developing countries 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
Gross Domestic Product 
GDP at market exchange rates 
GDP at purchasing power parities exchange rates 
Gross National Product 
giga [billion (lo9)] tonnes of carbon 
giga [billion (lo9)] tonnes oil equivalent 
Gross World Product 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
industrialized countries (OECD plus REFS) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
kilograms oil equivalent 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Middle East and North Africa 
Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their 
General Environmental Impacts, IIASA 
Megawatt 
[million (lo6)] tonnes oil equivalent 
market exchange rate 
North America 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Pacific OECD 
Other Pacific Asia 
primary energy 
parts per million by volume 
purchasing power parities 
Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation model, IIASA 
reforming economies (EEU plus FSU) 
South Asia 
Scenario Generator model, IIASA 
sulphur dioxide 
total primary energy 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
World Energy Council 
Western Europe 
World Health Organization 
1 1 world regions macroeconomic energy model, IIASA 
